THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT established by Executive Order in 1933 and granted a federal charter in 1948, is authorized Although much has been written about the to extend nonrecourse loans to farmers who history, administration, and effects of the use agricultural commodities from the most reCommodity Credit Corporation's loan procent harvest as collateral. The loan program gram, little quantitative research on loan was designed to foster a more orderly marketactivity has been reported. Recent studies by ing procedure and stabilize agricultural prices Chennareddy and Holmes [1, 2] provide some and income, but farmers also use this program empirical relationships but do not include an as both a residual market and a speculation underlying behavioral model or economic and marketing aid. The amount loaned to a rationale. In this section, a behavioral model is farmer equals the quantity of the commodity derived in which profit maximizing behavior pledged as collateral times a fixed per unit on the part of producers is assumed. value (loan rate) which is announced prior to Figure 1 is a representation of marketing the production period. Eligibility of a farmer for a CCC loan may require compliance with FIGURE 1. FARMER'S MARKETING USDA allotment or set-aside programs and ALTERNATIVES storage of the commodity in a CCC approved facility. The CCC's commodity demand via the The first section of this article presents a bealternatives available to crop producers at harhavioral model for quantities of commodities vest. 3 At time t, a producer may decide to sell a put under loan with the CCC. In the second secportion (QSJ of his harvest, to use a portion tion, econometric specifications of the behav-(QLPJ as collateral for a bank loan, to hold a ioral model are formulated and equations are portion (QP) of the grain privately without developed and used to estimate quantities of pledging it as security for a loan, or to put a corn and wheat put under loan.
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The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT established by Executive Order in 1933 and granted a federal charter in 1948, is authorized Although much has been written about the to extend nonrecourse loans to farmers who history, administration, and effects of the use agricultural commodities from the most reCommodity Credit Corporation's loan procent harvest as collateral. The loan program gram, little quantitative research on loan was designed to foster a more orderly marketactivity has been reported. Recent studies by ing procedure and stabilize agricultural prices Chennareddy and Holmes [1, 2] provide some and income, but farmers also use this program empirical relationships but do not include an as both a residual market and a speculation underlying behavioral model or economic and marketing aid. The amount loaned to a rationale. In this section, a behavioral model is farmer equals the quantity of the commodity derived in which profit maximizing behavior pledged as collateral times a fixed per unit on the part of producers is assumed. value (loan rate) which is announced prior to Figure 1 is a representation of marketing the production period. Eligibility of a farmer for a CCC loan may require compliance with FIGURE 1. FARMER'S MARKETING USDA allotment or set-aside programs and ALTERNATIVES storage of the commodity in a CCC approved facility. The CCC's commodity demand via the assumes ownership of the pledged commodity.
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As a federally chartered corporation, the
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CCC receives its program funds from the U.S.
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Treasury, and estimates of quantities put under loan with the CCC are important inputs / to the budgetary process. 2 Loan activity has PUT UDER \/ been especially volatile in the 1970s, and a pro-/L YDEFAUL/cc cedure for forecasting loan volume should V Loc T J prove useful for more efficient budgeting, program staffing, and administration.
The first section of this article presents a bealternatives available to crop producers at harhavioral model for quantities of commodities vest. 3 At time t, a producer may decide to sell a put under loan with the CCC. In the second secportion (QSJ of his harvest, to use a portion tion, econometric specifications of the behav-(QLPJ as collateral for a bank loan, to hold a ioral model are formulated and equations are portion (QP) of the grain privately without developed and used to estimate quantities of pledging it as security for a loan, or to put a corn and wheat put under loan. 'Although other quantities such as loans defaulted and direct purchases by the CCC also affect CCC-related Treasury outlays, only amounts put under loan are direclvy considered in this article.
'The focus of this article is on quantities of a given crop put under loan with the CCC in a given year. Given this focus, emphasis is placed on identifying the major behavioral factors affecting the farmer's decision process at the time of harvest. Accordingly, such issues as disposing of quantities stored from previous crop years or options of participating in reseal or producer-held reserve programs in future years are not analyzed. sum (QSt + QLPt + QPt + QLC) must equal the collateral for a loan when Pt+ -Pt > Sn.. farmer's harvest (QHJ. The producer is asUnder these circumstances farmers would not sumed to choose these four quantities so as to find it profitable to enter into loan agreements maximize his profit. Without loss of generality, with either public or private creditors. Howthe producer also can be assumed to hold all ever, a farmer generally has regular financial unsold quantities until the (t + n)t time period obligations which preclude withholding his at which point the commodity is either sold in production from the market without some type the market or defaulted to creditors. ' of loan. The following additional notation is used.
If the producer attempts to meet his fiPt= price of the commodity in time t nancial obligations or incur additional commitLRPt = loan rate granted by private finanments without resorting to government procial institutions in time t grams, his decision criterion for profit maximi- willing and able to loan funds to producers. In The cost of redeeming loans in the (t + n)t time times of low or unstable prices, when loans are period is: most needed by farmers, private lending institutions may not be willing to make commodity (1 + nIRPJLRPt(QLP, -QDPL+ + loans. The CCC loan program gives the farmer an additional alternative. (1 + nIRCJLRCt(QLCt -QDCt+J). 5 If the producer attempts to use the CCC loan program instead of private financial interRevenue from market sales of quantities sold mediaries, his profit maximizing decision in time period (t + n) is: criteria would be the same as those specified in equations 1, 2, and 3 with LRCt, IRCt, and Pt+n[(QLP, -QDPt+) + QPt + (QLCt -QDCt+)].
QLCt substituted for LRPt, IRPt, and QLPt, respectively. Because the interest rate charged If the producer had perfect knowledge of by the CCC is less than that charged in the prifuture prices and did not have institutional vate sector and the CCC's commodity demand constraints or cash flow requirements, he is always perfectly elastic at the loan rate, comwould maximize his profit from his harvest by modities would not be used as collateral for a selling when Pt+n -Pt < Sn and storing the loan in the private sector if there were no insticommodity privately without pledging it as tutional constraints within the CCC loan pro- ' The empirical analyses in the next section are based on yearly time periods and n = 1.
'For an individual farmer, the amounts QDPt+n and QDCt+n will generally be either zero or the total amount pledged as collateral. However, in the aggregate only the following inequalities need apply. O < QDPt+n < QLPt O < QDCt+n < QLCt 1For simplicity, transaction, transportation, and opportunity costs are not explicitly brought into the analysis. The variable Sn can be defined to include these factors.
gram. However, to be eligible for the CCC loan quires identification of the primary purposes program, the producer is often required to for which the model is to be used, selection of comply with other commodity programs, such data series which adequately measure the as acreage set-aside. A farmer may view the theoretical variables, and choice of a specific "package of programs" as being unprofitable functional form. The model specified in this although participation in the loan program section is intended for forecasting annual alone may be profitable. An additional eligibilquantities of crops put under loan with the ity constraint is that commodities must be CCC. Of specific interest is the response of loan stored in approved facilities. If facilities are activity to government policy instruments. not available or the farmer simply does not
Empirical applications of the model are prewish to comply with all program provisions, he sented for corn and wheat. These crops were may have to use private creditors.
chosen because of their high proportion of total To this point, it has been assumed that the CCC loan activity. producer has perfect knowledge of prices in future time periods. As this is not the case, decisions are based on price expectations. Any
Model Specification decision based on uncertain price information should take price volatility, i.e., risk, into acThe estimation model is specified as: count. The producer would like to be able to minimize his loss if price is lower than expect-(4) Qt = F(PRATIOt, IRATIOt, RISKt, ed, yet fully capture any gain resulting from PROD,, PACREt, COMVARJ price being above its expected value. The CCC loan program provides this type of assistance.
where If the price is higher than expected, the farmer can remove his commodity from the loan pro-Q = quantity put under loan with gram, repay the loan with interest, and capitalthe CCC in time period t, milize on the higher market price. If, however, lion bushels price is lower, he may elect to default on both PRATIO, = ratio of the CCC loan rate to principal and interest without penalty. A loan season average market price default in the private sector would most fortime period t certainly involve some penalty because the IRATIO, = ratio of the CCC interest rate farmer's credit rating would be affected.
to the average rate of interest An additional consideration is that the procharge by Production Credit ducer may view income taxes as a marketing Associations (PCA) in time cost. It could be advantageous for the farmer period t to delay his marketing until a new calendar RISK, = three-year moving variance of year to achieve a lower tax rate, thus lowering season average price (P)
his expected tax bill and increasing his net re- The equations were refitted with the addiand intermediate term forecasts can be made tional 1975 observations. These regression with existing commodity models, e.g., see [9] .
results are shown in the lower part of wheat put under loan with the CCC. Both equaparticipating in government crop programs tions track the historical period rather well at (PARTC). A similar specification for corn both high and low quantity levels when actual yielded poor results because of multicollinearlevels of the explanatory variables are used to ity. A legislative dummy variable (LEDGV) generate the forecasts. which reflects the relatively stricter eligibility
The addition of the 1975 observations requirements in effect before 1971 was substigreatly increased the precision of the tuted. 7 estimated coefficients with only minor effects It is assumed that the private sector loan on their magnitude. The t value increased for rate is reflected in the season average market all coefficients except the coefficient of price because financial intermediaries lend in PACRE in the wheat equation which remained proportion to the market value of the collateressentially unchanged. All variables except al. Storage cost and capacity variables are not PACRE in the wheat equation are significant included because of lack of reliable data. 8 at or above the 0.1 level. The increased preciAll variables enter the equation by separate sion can be attributed to an increase in the linear relationships except those contained in overall variability of IRATIO and RISK due to PRATIO and IRATIO. These were entered in the inclusion of the 1975 observations. These ratio form to reduce multicollinearity, conserve variables were relatively stable before 1972. degrees of freedom, and convert the variables The R and standard error for each equation to real terms without specifying additional dealso were marginally improved. The Durbinflation variables. The ratio form constrains the Watson statistics are relatively high, component variables to have elasticities that especially for the corn equations, but all are are equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. 9 within the inconclusive region of the test. 8The omission of a relevant explanatory variable will lead to specification bias if the omitted variable is correlated with the remaining explanatory variables. Because a priori judgments as to correlation between the storage cost and capacity variables and the remaining explanatory variables are not posited and data for empirical analysis are not available, speculation as to the sign and magnitude of any bias rests with one's intuition. The author's intuition is that the effect will be negligible. The reader is invited to make his/her own evaluation.
'Note, however, that price also appears in the risk variable, so the absolute values of elasticity with respect to price and with respect to the loan rate will differ slightly.
The elasticities of several explanatory varicause of the two planting periods for wheat and ables are similar for the corn and wheat equathe greater effect of exports on price expectations. Both equations show strong loan tions in the wheat market. rate/market price ratio effects with mean elasThe compliance variable for corn (LEGDV) ticities of 4.14 and 3.42 for corn and wheat, reindicates that the less rigid acreage diversion spectively. At 1977 levels of the variables the requirements of the set-aside provision imple elasticities are estimated to be 1.72 and 1.64 mented in 1971 shifted the supply relation upfor corn and wheat, respectively. Thus, a 10 ward by 350 million bushels. For wheat, the percent reduction in the CCC corn and wheat coefficient of PARTC indicates that at the loan rates, ceteris paribus, would lead to an margin a 1 percent increase in program particiapproximate 17 percent reduction in quantities pation would increase wheat loan volume by of corn and wheat put under loan. °a pproximately 4 million bushels.
The elasticities for IRATIO and RISK at mean levels are also similar across equations.
Model Forecasts In absolute terms, the coefficients of IRATIO indicate that a 0.1 increase in the magnitude of The equations given in Table 2 presented in Table 3 . The actual values of corn The coefficient of the price expectation variand wheat loan volume for the 1976-1977 crop able (PACRE) in the corn equation indicates year were 276 and 491 million bushels, respecthat an increase of $0.10 in expected price of tively. Preliminary reports indicate that as of corn would lead to an increase of 12.5 million June 1978 corn and wheat loan volume for bushels in corn put under loan. 1 The coeffi-1977-1978 crop year was approximately 1,041 cient of PACRE in the wheat equation is relaand 582 million bushels, respectively. As inditively small and not significant, possibly becated previously, the equations fitted through 'tUnder the new 1977 farm legislation, the Secretary of Agriculture has the authoritv to reduce the loan rate 1h up to tt) percent if market price is within 1()5 percent of the loan rate. For more information, see 161.
"From 191. the change in planted acreage due to a one unit change in expected price (dPACRE/dPE) is approximatel f5 million acres 'Thus (dQ'dPEI = (dQ'dPACRE) (dPACRE'dPE) = (25i * 5) = 125f million bushels per dollar. The 1977-1978 forecasts imply Treasury outThe principal difference between this study lays for commodity loans of $2.22 billion for ofhennareddy and Holmes is t corn and $1.53 billion for wheat. These corn and $1.53 billion for wtheat. These specification of the estimated model. In their amounts are to be repaid with interet at study, all variables from the supply-utilization maturity. If a loan is defaulted at maturity identity along with own market price and loan CCC assumes ownership of the commodity.
rate, prices of substitute commodities, and the Under the 1977 legislation, the farmer now has were allowed to enter a the option at the time of maturity to hold the P i the option at the pdtime -f matuty to hold the statistical specification via stepwise regrescommodity in the producer-held reserve prosion. loan volume and to analyze the impact on loan market price and loan rate elasticities derived volume of alternative CCC loan and interest by the method presented in this article are rate levels. Alternatively, the equations can be -4.31 and +4.14 for corn and -3.51 and +3.42 used to determine the levels of loan and interfor wheat, all evaluated at mean values. For est rates that would be associated with a dethe other two variables common to both sired level of loan activity. studies, production and PCA interest rate, Several topics of future research can be cited. Chennareddy and Holmes report elasticities of First, the empirical results for corn and wheat +1.99 and -0.96 for wheat and +1. 21 and +2.53 suggest that the application of similar for corn, respectively. Only the wheat produceconometric models to other program crops is tion elasticity of +1.99 was significantly differwarranted. It would also be useful to relate the ent from zero in their study. It is also noted compliance variable explicitly to farm program that for wheat, their elasticity with respect to provisions and market conditions. Additionalthe PCA loan rate (-0.96) has the wrong sign.
ly, a similar behavioral approach could be used to specify equations for quantities defaulted to SUMMARY the CCC and quantities placed in the producerheld reserve. This additional research would Prediction equations for commodities put provide the components for a comprehensive under loan with the CCC are developed from model of price support loan activity, which behavioral relations assuming profit maximizwould be useful not only for budget analysis ing behavior by producers. The estimated but also for evaluating a broad range of policy equations can be used to forecast crop year and market interactions.
